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I. INTRODUCTION
Businesses of all sizes are discovering intellectual property
rights to be among their most important assets. Large enterpris-
es may have staffs of lawyers and other intellectual property
specialists, while small businesses usually do not. Small business-
es, therefore, more often risk losing their rights in these valuable
assets, simply because they are unaware of the steps that must be
taken to protect themselves.
Assume, for example, that a business owner hires a software
consultant to assist in computerizing the business's operations.
After several planning sessions, in which our business owner
explains many details of her enterprise to the consultant, she
and the consultant agree on computer hardware and the
specifications for the necessary software. The consultant writes
t Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
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the software, and after some initial debugging, everything works
well. It works so well, in fact, that our business owner soon
realizes that she may have, in the software, a product more
valuable than anything in her ordinary inventory. But does she
own the software, or does the consultant? Can she sell copies of
the software?
These facts raise questions of copyright law in perhaps the
area of intellectual property law that is the most accessible, and
at the same time most confusing, to the nonspecialist. It is
accessible because its subject matter is familiar-books, records,
movies, and so on. It is confusing because of its history of
arcane dogma having to do with such things as the copyright
notice (0 mystical "©"!) and the supposedly supreme impor-
tance of registering a claim to copyright.
Dogma and "common" sense aside, copyright is important
to many businesses-many more than are aware of its impor-
tance. So-called "literary works" protected by copyright include
(among other things) anything expressed in "words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia."1 The value of a
copyright may exist in a marketplace, as our hypothetical
business owner above learned. The value may also be present in
a strategic sense when it confers an operational advantage
without becoming a product or service that the business sells. A
distributor of perfume might find, for example, that its best
route to exclude "gray market" importers from its territory is via
a claim of copyright in the label and packaging of a certain
brand of perfume.2
A little knowledge about copyright can be a useful thing. In
particular, questions of copyright ownership typically arise at a
time when the parties are not being counseled by copyright
lawyers. At this stage, two tasks are most important. First, the
lawyer must recognize situations involving a copyright. Second,
when a copyright is involved, she must make appropriate
1. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
2. See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 3 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994);
BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C&C
Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1391-92 (C.D. Cal. 1993). The reasons underlying
the utility of copyright for these purposes, rather than trademark, are beyond the scope
of this article, but are discussed in K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988);
see also 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11 [B]
(1995); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§§ 6.01-.10 (3rd ed. 1937).
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arrangements regarding ownership of the right.
This article attempts to facilitate both of these tasks. Part II
briefly outlines some copyright basics, including the varieties of
copyrightable subject matter under the Copyright Act of 1976
(the "Act"). Part III describes copyright ownership, focusing on
the kinds of transactions most likely to take place in the context
of small business, including the "work for hire" doctrine. Armed
with these fundamentals, the small-business lawyer may find that
copyright litigation will rarely become necessary.
II. COPYRIGHT BASICS
No complete analysis of copyright is attempted here, nor
would it be appropriate to do so, given the limited scope of this
article. Rather, the purpose here is first, to sensitize the non-
copyright lawyer to situations that may raise copyright issues, and
second, to provide the essential framework for an understanding
of copyright ownership. The latter requires an overview of
several of the most important features of the copyright terrain;
the former involves primarily issues of protectable subject matter.
A. Copyrightable Subject Matter
Copyright law has expanded far beyond its early borders
when it protected primarily works of high authorship, such as
poetry, drama, fine art, and music. Copyright continues to
protect such works, but it also protects a wide range of items that
are less intuitively copyrightable. Belt buckles,4 taxidermists'
3. In the United States, copyright has been more catholic than it has in Europe.
Fairly early on, in a case involving advertising for a circus, Mr.Justice Holmes noted the
irrelevance for American copyright purposes of aesthetic merit. Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). Likewise, American copyright law
protects certain kinds of interest that on the Continent are viewed as questionable,
because they do not reflect the quality of "authorship" considered prerequisite to
copyright there. For example, in the United States sound recordings are considered
proper subject matter for copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (7) (1994). By
contrast, many European nations protect sound recordings by so-called "neighboring
rights" (rights "neighboring" to copyright) and remain reluctant to acknowledge
authorship in works so influenced by technology. See, e.g., COPYRIGHT LAWS AND
TREATIES OF THE WORLD, Vol. 3 (discussing the Rome Convention).
4. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that decorative belt buckles that were used principally for ornamentation
could be copyrighted as primary ornamental aspect of buckles).
1996]
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forms,5 video games, 6 the addition of color to a previously black-
and-white picture,7 and product labels8 have all been held
copyrightable.
From a technical perspective, copyright imposes two
requirements for protection. To achieve protection, a work must
be an "original work of authorship" that is "fixed in a tangible
medium of expression."9 Each of these requirements is fairly
complex, but for purposes of this article, the "fixation" require-
ment can be quickly described: to be "fixed," a work must be
embodied in a tangible copy, and this embodiment of the work
must have been done by the author, or under the author's
authority. The requirement of "tangibility" means that the copy
must be in a medium that will persist for some non-trivial, non-
ephemeral period of time.1" Thus, the image resulting from
the activation of phosphors on a television tube is not a "fixa-
tion"; the image resulting from a photocopying process is a
fixation. The requirement that the fixation occur by or under
the author's authority is intended to preclude a claim of
copyright in a work that was made tangible by a person lacking
the author's permission to do so. For example, a person who
illicitly tape-records a musical performance cannot claim a
copyright in a musical work-the work was neither fixed by, nor
under the authority of, the author of the work.1'
5. Superior Form Builders v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 851 F. Supp. 222,
224 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that taxidermist forms are property copyrightable as
sculptural works).
6. E.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992);
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 847 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Atari
Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic
Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983).
7. Sargent v. American Greetings Corp., 588 F. Supp. 912, 924, 1014 (N.D. Ohio
1984).
8. E.g., Fargo Mercantile Co. v. Brechet & Richter Co., 295 F. 823 (8th Cir. 1924);
GB Mktg. USA, Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen GmbH & Co., 782 F. Supp. 763, 776
(W.D.N.Y. 1991).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of "fixed"). Possible complexities can arise
here if the work exists in a medium that is dependent on the maintenance of some
condition. For example, a work may exist in the memory of a computer for only so
long as electrical power is applied to the circuit of which the memory is a part. Is the
work "fixed?" Courts have so far held it is. SeeAdvanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc.
v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 362-63 (E.D. Va. 1994).
11. This provision is probably redundant, insofar as our hypothetical bootlegger
cannot claim "originality" with respect to the musical work either. See infra notes 13-16
and accompanying text.
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The "fixation" requirement also emphasizes that copyright
protects only expression, and never an idea. 12 Ideas can be freely
copied, and indeed it is a goal of copyright to aid the dissemina-
tion of ideas while protecting, for a limited time, the manner in
which those ideas are expressed. Once a work is fixed, its ideas
have necessarily been expressed (one could argue that what is
fixed is the expression, ideas being inherently incapable of being
fixed) and the likelihood of protection increases substantially.
Protection is not yet certain. There remains the require-
ment of "originality." In copyright law, the term "originality" has
a dual meaning. First, to say that the work is "original" to its
author means that the work owes its origin to that person, or in
other words that the work was not copied.'" Second, to say a
work is "original" means that it exhibits at least some minimal
creativity, some "creative spark." Uniqueness or novelty is not
required, merely some minimal degree of creativity is necessary:
a creative "spark,"4 not a bonfire, is necessary. 5 This require-
ment of at least a little creativity is constitutional, and therefore
cannot be legislatively changed."
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). The rule raises a problem, however: what if an
idea can be expressed in only one, or a very limited number, of ways? The difficulty
is that protecting the expression in such a case could amount to protecting the idea,
because no one else could use the idea without infringing the expression. Copyright's
pragmatic answer to this problem is that while the expression remains protectable, as
a question of subject matter, the copyright in such expression (referred to as "merged"
with the idea) cannot be enforced. Autoskill Inc. v. National Educ. Supply Sys., Inc.,
994 F.2d 1476, 1494 (10th Cir. 1993); Financial Control Assocs., Inc. v. Equity Builders
Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1103, 1118 (D. Kan. 1992). At least one court has gone further,
holding that merger actually extinguishes the copyrightability of the work. Morrissey
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967). This approach is less
desirable, although conceptually the result may be the same. It is preferable to keep
the requirements for copyrightability uncluttered (originality plus fixation), and leave
more complex and metaphysical questions regarding the number of distinct ways in
which an idea can be expressed for the later determination whether a particular act of
copying in fact infringed the copyright.
13. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). It is
possible, of course, that exactly the same work (e.g., an identical poem) was earlier
created by another. This, however, at least in theory, is no bar to copyright in the later
poem, because that (later-created) poem nevertheless owes its origin to the later poet.
This remains true as long as the later poet did not copy the earlier work. As a practical
matter, however, a fact-finder is not compelled to believe assertions of independent
creation, and is permitted to infer copying from a high degree of similarity between the
two works.
14. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 346.
19961 1473
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Originality, in both senses, is fundamental to copyright
protection. No copyright can subsist in a work that is not
original. What then of a work that, while not the least bit
"creative," nevertheless required a great deal of time, effort,
money, or all three, to assemble? Is there any possibility for
protecting by copyright the laborious collection of data, none of
which can be said to have "originated" with the author? The
answer will depend upon whether the "selection, coordination and
arrangement"17 of the data are original, that is, whether these
elements can be said both to have originated with the author of
the collection, and to be at least minimally creative. Regardless
of the nature of a work or the medium of its execution, copy-
right in it exists only if the work is "original.""s Failing that, no
copyright is available. Mere "sweat of the brow" is not protected.
A recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Feist v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.,19 provides a comprehensive overview of originality
under the Copyright Act. Feist involved a "white pages" tele-
phone directory published by the imaginatively-named Rural
Telephone Company. Feist, publisher of a multi-county directory
(but not a provider of telephone service), requested permission
from Rural to copy Rural's directory. Permission was refused,
but Feist used the listing anyway, and Rural sued for copyright
infringement. When the case reached the Court, Justice
O'Connor wrote for the majority, holding that the listings in the
white pages lacked enough originality to qualify for copyright
protection. After all, reasoned Justice O'Connor, the white
pages are nothing more than an alphabetical listing of the names
of Rural's subscribers. Neither the names, nor their alphabetical
arrangement, can be said to have "originated" with Rural, and in
that sense, they are not original to Rural. Moreover, she
continued, an alphabetical listing of the names of a company's
customers does not evidence the necessary small amount of
"creativity." The threshold may be low, but some creativity is
essential before copyright will attach. Were the white pages to
qualify as "creative," opined Justice O'Connor, it would be
difficult indeed to point to an example of a work that was not
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "compilation").
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
19. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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creative. 0
Where does Feist leave the requirement of originality? The
case has provided a thorough analysis of the nature and
origin" of the requirement, and it also provided a glimpse of
what will not be found original. Beyond that, however, no lines
are drawn, and it is probably impossible to construct a test that
will serve for all works. Creative works are each different. There
is no real comparability between one and the other. One
consequence of this reality is that each work must be evaluated
for originality on its own merit, and there is no one yardstick
that can measure them all adequately.
In section 102, the Copyright Act gives a number of
examples of copyrightable works. These are non-exclusive, and
other categories may be added by Congress or the courts.
Among the examples are musical works (including accompany-
ing words); dramatic works (including accompanying music);
pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works; movies and other audiovisual works; sound
recordings; architectural works; and literary works.2
Probably the broadest category in the statutory list is that of
"literary works," which includes computer software, 23 the
microcode in silicon ROM chips,24 and even text from a bottle
of hair treatment describing the product.25 It is not far off the
mark to say that "literary works," for copyright purposes, include
20. Id. at 362.
21. Id. Justice O'Connor held that the originality requirement is based on the
Constitution. This aspect of the holding essentially ensures that Congress cannot undo
what the Court hath wrought.
22. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)-(8) (1994).
23. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT, 9-43 (July 31, 1978) (discussing computers and
copyright).
24. E.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249
(3d Cir. 1983).
25. Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909. 913
(D.NJ. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that this
language was copyrightable):
Hair stays wet-looking as long as you like. Brushes out to full-bodied dry look. WET 4
is one step-four choice (finishing) in Sebastian's four-step program for a healthy scalp
and head of hair. WET is not oily, won't flake and keeps hair wet-looking for hours,
allowing you to sculpture, contour, wave or curl. It stays looking wet until it's brushed
out. When brushed, hair looks and feels thicker, extra full. Try brushing partly, leaving
some parts wet for a different look.
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anything that can be expressed in writing and that is not
specifically covered elsewhere in the statute.
B. Duration of Copyright
Also fundamental to copyright is the duration of the
protection it provides. In the United States, copyright has
essentially two rules for duration (at least insofar as works
created on or after January 1, 1978 are concerned).6 Under
the first rule, which applies when the author is a natural person
whose identity is determinable, copyright lasts for the life of the
author plus fifty years.27 In cases of joint authorship, the rule
provides that copyright lasts for the lifetime of the last survivor
plus fifty years. 8
The second rule regarding duration applies when the
author is not a natural person and therefore does not have a
measuring lifetime, and when the author's identity cannot be
determined. Under this rule, copyright lasts for 100 years from
the creation of the work, or seventy-five years from its first
publication, whichever ends first.29
The rather long duration of copyright protection no doubt
served important policies in the age when exploitation of
copyrighted works proceeded slowly. At that time in history, the
value of a copyrighted work normally could not be realized
within the author's lifetime. Therefore, extending protection
into the succeeding generation of the author's heirs at least
ensured that the author's progeny would benefit from the
author's creative labors. The long duration is less justifiable
today, and in some cases (e.g., computer programs) results in the
author receiving all of the economic benefit from the work, with
the public succeeding to the author's interest only after it is
entirely played out. This change in the speed with which works
are fully exploited, however, has not deterred proposals to
26. Works created before that date are subject to some additional complexity that,
while not unmanageable, is beyond the scope of this article. See 17 U.S.C. § 303 (1994)
(works created but not published or copyrighted before January 1, 1978); § 304(a)
(copyrights in their first term onJanuary 1, 1978); § 304(b) (copyrights in their renewal
term on January 1, 1978).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994). There is a proposal pending before Congress to
extend the term provided by this rule to the author's life plus 70 years; the European
Union (EU) has already adopted such a term.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1994).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1994).
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extend copyright's term of protection still further, for seventy
years after the author's death."
C. Copyright Formalities
Historically, U.S. copyright law has been somewhat notorious
for relying upon arcane formalities, noncompliance with which
could easily result in forfeiture of the copyright. Since the U.S.
accession to the Berne Convention, however, the formalities have
been for the most part eliminated.31 Thus, a copyright notice
is no longer required.3" Likewise, registration of copyright is
no longer required for a copyright to subsist in a work.3 For
works whose country of origin is the United States, however,
registration is required before copyright can be enforced," and
in most cases, neither statutory damages nor attorney's fees are
available for infringements taking place before copyright in the
infringed work has been registered. 5
In sum, then, the chief formality that remains relevant today
is registration, which for many works is a prerequisite to
enforcement of a copyright. At the planning for ownership
stage, with which this article is primarily concerned, no formali-
ties are required. Attaching a copyright notice, however, is
recommended-it's cheap, it's easy, and it may prevent an unautho-
rized use.
D. Rights Protected by Copyright
Finally, a basic working knowledge of copyright requires
30. See supra note 27. Certain EU countries, for example Germany, have already
extended their terms of protection. Although this does not require the United States
to similarly extend its term, there are some who believe that U.S. credibility in
persuading other nations to strengthen their intellectual property laws is undermined
if the United States itself has laws that are noticeably weaker than the EU countries.
31. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (1988) made copyright notice optional and eliminated the requirement of
registration as a prerequisite to suit for works whose country of origin is not the United
States. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-02, 411 (1994).
32. The copyright notice, however, remains worthwhile. Attaching a copyright
notice is probably the cheapest form of protection available, and will deter many
potential infringements. See Warren L. Patton &John C. Hogan, The Copyrightable Notice
Requirement-Deliberate Omission of Notice, 5 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 225 (1983).
33. In fact, registration was seldom prerequisite to the existence of a copyright,
even under the 1909 Act.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1994).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1994).
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some understanding of the rights that are protected when
copyright subsists in a work. First and foremost is the right to
make copies (the "reproduction right").36 This is the essence
of copyright and is very likely the most-exploited right in the
"bundle of rights" copyright comprises. A work is copied
whenever a fixation of the work is made, and each fixation of a
work constitutes a "copy."3 7  But making copies is not the only
exclusive right an author gets under the Copyright Act. Section
106, the key provision of the Act conferring rights on copyright
owners, 3 also provides for exclusive rights to do the following:
create "derivative works" (that is, adaptations, translations, and
other kinds of works based on the author's work) (the "adaptation
right");39 distribute copies of the work to the public (the
"publication right");' perform certain kinds of works publicly
(the "performance right");4 display certain kinds of works
publicly (the "display right") ;42 and distribute digital perfor-
mances of musical works to the public (the "digital performance
right") .43
These exclusive rights protect the ability to exploit the work
economically. They are not intended to shield against the kind
of use that might demean a copyrighted work, or harm the
reputation of its author, unless the use directly impairs the
36. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
38. Copyright Act § 106 addresses rights of the copyright owner, but it is not the
only such provision. For example, section 106A confers so-called "moral rights" on
certain authors. In addition, other provisions of the Act can be considered to confer
rights on copyright owners, although they are not worded specifically as such. For
example, section 602 creates what may be thought of as an "importation right,"
pursuant to which an author (or licensee, for example an exclusive distributor) may
exclude at the U.S. border articles that are being imported without authority of the
owner of right. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium,
38 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1994); BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir.
1991); Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contact Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1097 (3rd Cir.
1988); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., 569 F. Supp. 47, 48
(E.D. Penn. 1983).
39. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(2) (West 1996).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1994). The performance right extends only to literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, and to pantomimes, motion pictures, and
other audiovisual works. Id.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (1994). The display right, like the performance right, is
limited to certain kinds of works: literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic and sculptural works. Id.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (1994).
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rights-owner's ability to exploit the work commercially." That
kind of protection, still very new in the United States, is provided
only by the so-called "moral rights," and is available explicitly
only to certain works of fine art45 (although it may in certain
cases be available to other kinds of works pursuant to court
interpretations of the Copyright Act and other federal and state
intellectual property doctrines).' Still, the economic rights
provided by the Copyright Act are substantial and certainly well
worth protecting.
III. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP AND WORKS FOR HIRE
The foregoing will serve to give the reader some basic
information about what is copyrightable (a great variety of works,
including almost everything that can be written down), how it is
copyrighted (simply by creating the work-copyright attaches
automatically, with no further action needed, when a work is
fixed in a tangible medium of expression), how long copyright
protection lasts, and finally what rights are reserved to the
copyright owner. We turn now to questions of who owns the
copyright.
A. Initial Ownership
In general, the initial owner of the copyright in a work is
the person who created the work, i.e., the work's "author."47
This is presupposed by some of the basics covered immediately
above, i.e., that there are no mandatory formalities attached to
copyright. This can be true only if the copyright springs into
being at the moment of the work's creation. As a general rule,
the creator of a work is the "author" of the work, and the author
has all the exclusive rights discussed above. Of course, every rule
has its exceptions. In this case, the exception concerns a
circumstance in which the creator of the work is not legally the
work's "author". 4
The idea that the creator of the work initially owns copy-
44. See Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
851 (1947).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994) (defining rights limited to authors of "work[s] of
visual art").
46. See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
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right in the work depends, of course, on original creation. Thus,
if a work is simply copied from a preexisting work, nothing has
been created and for this reason, an infringer of copyright
cannot gain a copyright in the infringing work. Originality is a
subject matter requirement, but it has implications for author-
ship as well.
B. Originality and Authorship; Joint Authorship
We noted above that in copyright law, the term "originality"
has a dual meaning. First, the work owes its origin to its creator,
that is the work was not copied.49 Second, to be original the
work must exhibit at least some minimal creativity, some
"creative spark." The act of authorship, then, can be conceived
as the act not merely of "making something," but of making
something creative. It is the act of "creation" in the truest sense
of the word. It follows, then, that in the absence of this kind of
contribution to a work, a person is not an "author."
This point can become significant in evaluating claims of
joint authorship by a person who contributed to a work to which
another has also contributed. Courts have struggled with such
claims, because of the difficulty of deciding at what point a
contribution is no longer de minimis and rises to a level deserving
recognition as an author. The goal of the Copyright Act, to
encourage the dissemination of works of authorship, might be
met regardless of whether a contribution is recognized as
authorship in any particular case.5" The dominant approach at
present is to require that the contribution of each joint author
be copyrightable, at least when joint authorship is contested.51
Under this view, "creation" is required of every author, even joint
authors.52
49. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
50. One could argue that a consistent pattern of recognizing de minimis
contributions as authority might discourage the "real" authors, who would be required
to share ownership with the "impostors." Still, the latter almost always have contributed
something of value to the work, and the testimony of the parties on this point is
generally noticeably self-serving.
51. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2nd Cir. 1991); 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACrIcE § 4.2.1.2 (1989); WILLIAM F. PATRY,
LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAw 116 (6th ed. 1986). But see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.07 (1996).
52. The main problem with this approach is that it seems to preclude certain
intuitive strategies for joint authorship. For example, "You have the ideas, and I write
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C. Transfers of Copyright
To say that copyright initially vests in the author of a work
does not mean that it must stay there, or that it usually stays
there. The norm is for the author to transfer the copyright (or
some significant portion of it) to an entity that is more capable
of exploiting the work commercially; the normal consideration
to the author for this transfer is a royalty based on distribution
of the work. The Act provides that "[t]he ownership of a
copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means
of conveyance or by operation of law . . . . "" This is subject
to a statute of frauds provision that requires a transfer to be in
writing to be valid.54
Significantly, however, the author or her survivors have a
statutory privilege to terminate a transfer thirty-five years after the
transfer was executed.55 This right to reclaim the copyright
recognizes that it is impossible to accurately value a copyright at
its inception; only the marketplace can supply that information.
Should the work become a success in the marketplace, the law
seeks to spread some of the benefit of that success to the author
and her heirs by permitting them to reclaim and relicense the
copyright at a price more accurately reflecting its value.
D. Works for Hire
Most of this discussion of authorship has emphasized the
artistic contribution made by the author to the work. Copyright,
however, is not principally concerned with art. Copyright
focuses on the author and is primarily concerned with the
economic benefits of authorship. Not surprisingly, then, U.S.
copyright law also recognizes an economic kind of authorship.
This economic authorship emphasizes the role of a person who
makes creation of a work economically feasible and who is economi-
them down" would not, under this approach, result in joint authorship if the person
contributing the fixation were to challenge the authorship of the other contributor. In
such a case, the "idea person" has not contributed anything copyrightable, and
therefore would not be entitled to protection. See Childress, 945 F.2d at 502.
53. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1994).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994). Transfers may be registered, just as initial
ownership may be, although (like original ownership) they are valid regardless of
registration. 17 U.S.C. § 204(b) (1994).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994).
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cally essential to the creation of the work. This approach to
authorship, which stresses the importance of the financial
investment that makes creation of works possible, is embodied in
the work-for-hire doctrine. The work-for-hire doctrine grants the
status of author to the employer of a person who creates a work
within the scope of her employment.
1. History
The 1909 Copyright Act (the immediate predecessor of the
current Copyright Act) treated the work-for-hire doctrine only
briefly, in the statute's definitional section, which provided that
"the word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of
works made for hire."5" The statute did not, however, define
the term "employer" or "employee." The courts first construed
the law to mean that if the creator of the work was an employee
in the formal sense of the term then the author would be
deemed to be the employer. Eventually, the provision achieved
a broader scope and some courts applied it to situations
involving works "commissioned" by a hiring party from an
independent contractor. The results, however, were inconsistent.
Without a court ruling, a person could never be completely sure
that a particular relationship was one to which the work-for-hire
doctrine would apply.
2. Works for Hire under the 1976 Act
The 1976 Act attempted to relieve this uncertainty by
spelling out in some detail who was and who was not covered by
the work-for-hire doctrine. The definition of "work for hire" in
the 1976 Act is divided into two parts: (1) a work created by an
employee within the scope of his employment is considered a
work for hire (and therefore, the employer is considered to be
the author) ;57 and (2) a work that is "specially ordered or
commissioned" may also be a work for hire, if two additional
requirements are met. First, the work must fall into one of the
following nine categories:
(1) a contribution to a collective work;
(2) a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work;
(3) a translation;
56. 17 U.S.C. § 26 (immediate predecessor to the current Act that was repealed).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "work made for hire").
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(4) a supplementary work;
(5) a compilation;
(6) an instructional text;
(7) a test;
(8) answer material for a test; or
(9) an atlas.5"
Second, the parties must have executed a written agreement that
the work was to be considered a work for hire.59
Although certainly more detailed than its predecessor, the
1976 Act still left a number of important questions unanswered
under each of its two routes to work-for-hire status. Predictably,
the questions arising under the "employer-employee" provision
centered on first, who would be considered an "employee" and
second, what activities would be considered within the scope of
employment? As to "specially ordered or commissioned works,"
the principal question arising to date involves the timing of the
writing requirement: when must a writing classifying the work as
a work for hire be executed? Each of these questions is consid-
ered below.
a. Works Created by an Employee: Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid and Its Progeny
The first of the work-for-hire questions under the new
statute-who is an "employee" for copyright purposes?-proved
especially troublesome. Indeed, the federal circuit courts of
appeal came up with no less than four distinct answers. Thus, it
was left to the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the conflict and
answer the question in the landmark Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid (CCNV)' case.
In CCNV, Reid sculpted three human figures at the behest
of the Community for Creative Non-Violence, a non-profit
organization devoted, among other things, to publicizing the
plight of the homeless in America.61 The completed sculpture
depicted a homeless family huddled, with their meager belong-
ings, over a steam grate on a city street. 2 Intended to be
unveiled near Christmas, the work had an inscription at its base
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 490 U.S. 730 (1989) [hereinafter CCNVI.
61. Id. at 733.
62. Id.
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that read as follows: "And still there is no room at the inn."6
The idea for the sculpture, a latter-day scene reminiscent of the
Nativity, originated with Mitch Snyder, a member and trustee of
the Community.6 4 Snyder saw and commented upon prelimi-
nary sketches of the work and the Community paid Reid $15,000
to cover expenses.6
After the sculpture had been on display for one month, it
was returned to Reid's studio for some minor repairs.66 A few
months later, Snyder requested its return, to take it on a fund-
raising tour of several cities.6 7 Reid refused and filed a certifi-
cate of copyright registration for the sculpture.' Snyder, as
trustee for the Community, filed a competing certificate of
registration and the battle was joined.69
The district court held a trial and ruled that the sculpture
was a work for hire, and therefore the copyright belonged to the
Community, as Reid's employer.7' The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded on the
ground that the Act creates a dichotomy between employees and
independent contractors, and that therefore the appropriate test
for employee status would rely upon common-law principles of
agency. Applying those principles, the court of appeals
concluded that the work was not one created by an employee.72
The court of appeals, however, suggested that the parties might
be joint authors of the work and remanded to determine
whether that was the case. 7' The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari and, with a few modifications, affirmed the court of
appeals.
Under CCNV, employee status is determined by common law
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 734. Reid donated his services to the Community's cause. Id.
66. Id. at 735.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 736.
72. Id. at 739. Nor did the sculpture fit within the nine categories of works
potentially work for hire under the second prong of the definition. In any event, that
prong could not be satisfied because there was no written agreement to the effect that
the work was to be one for hire. Id.
73. Id.
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agency principles."4 The Court, however, recognized that this
conclusion might subject substantive federal copyright law to the
vagaries of state common law doctrine and therefore, in its most
important deviation from the holding of the court of appeals,
the Court further held that the common law to be applied was
the federal common law of agency.75 This body of law was then
and still is largely non-existent, but it will no doubt evolve and
grow to meet the new burden it must sustain. Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, relied heavily on section 220 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency in holding that the determina-
tion of employee status under the federal common law of agency
requires evaluation of twelve factors:
(1) the skill required to create the work;
(2) the source of the instrumentalities and tools used to
create the work;
(3) the location of the work place;
(4) the duration of the relationship between the hiring and
hired parties;
(5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party;
(6) the extent of the hiring party's discretion over the hours
worked;
(7) the method of payment;
(8) the hiring party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
(9) whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party;
(10) whether the hiring party is in business at all;
(11) the provision of employee benefits; and
(12) the tax treatment of the relationship (e.g., whether
income taxes are withheld, etc.)76
No single factor is determinative.77 Applying these factors to
the case before it, the Court concluded that Reid was not an
employee of the Community, but thatjoint authorship remained
a possibility and therefore affirmed the court of appeals.78
Since CCNV a number of significant work-for-hire cases in
74. CCNV, 490 U.S. at 739-40 (citing Kelle v. Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322-
23 (1974); Baker v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959); Robinson v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94 (1915)).
75. Id. at 740-41.
76. Id. at 751-52.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 753.
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the lower courts have raised the question of whether a person
doing the "hands-on" creative work was the employee of another.
Chief among them is Aymes v. Bonelli,79 which involved a dispute
between a computer consultant, Aymes, and a business owner,
Bonelli. Bonelli hired Aymes to work on certain computer
programs that were originally written for an older generation of
IBM computers. 80 The idea was to modify the programs to run
on newer equipment.81  At issue was whether Aymes was
Bonelli's "employee," so as to constitute Bonelli the author and
owner of the rewritten programs.8
2
In Aymes, the Second Circuit refined somewhat the CCNV
test, noting that some of the factors cited by the Supreme Court
would only rarely be of probative value, and identifying other
factors that, in the circuit court's view, would be significant in
virtually every case.8" The latter include the hiring party's right
to control the manner and means of creation;84 the skill
required; the hiring party's right to assign additional projects;
the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the
relationship." The Second Circuit's approach simplifies and
makes more manageable the CCNVtest; this approach has been
followed more or less consistently since the Aymes decision was
handed down.
The question remains whether the creative action of an
employee is within her scope of employment. The Supreme
Court has not yet spoken on this issue, but the lower courts
apply CCNV.86 For copyright purposes, common law principles
of agency govern not only the question of employee status, but
also the scope of that employee's employment.
79. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
80. Id. at 859.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 860.
83. Id. at 861.
84. Note that this was not actually a "factor" identified by the Supreme Court.
Rather, it appears to be the ultimate purpose of the Court's analysis of the factors. See
CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751.
85. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861.
86. SeeAvtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, No. 94-2364, 1995 WL 541610 at *4 (4th Cir. Sept.
13, 1995); Roeslin v. District of Columbia, 921 F. Supp. 793, 797, (D.D.C. 1995); City
of Newark v. Beasley, 883 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.N.J. 1995); Favela v. Fritz Cos., No. CV 92-
2450, 1993 WL 651875 at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 1993); see also Saenger Org., Inc. v.
Nationwide Ins. Licensing Assocs., 864 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D. Mass. 1994) (finding that
the employee agreed, "in his capacity as Vice President," to create the work in dispute).
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Typically, courts deciding scope of employment issues will
seek guidance from the Second Restatement of Agency, as did
the Court in deciding employee status in CCNV The Restate-
ment sets out a three-part test for the scope of employment.
The court must determine whether the employee's conduct:
(1) Is the kind of work the employee is employed to perform;
(2) Occurs substantially within authorized work hours and on
work premises; and
(3) Is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
employer.8 7
All three tests must be satisfied to establish that the conduct in
question was within the scope of employment."
Applying the first Restatement factor, regarding the "kind
of work the employee is employed to perform," courts give
weight to the following factors: the employee's job descrip-
tion;" the skills possessed by the employee at the time of
employment;' the employer's knowledge of the employee's
skills;91 the degree of control the employer had over the
employee's conduct;92 whether the work was of the sort com-
monly done by persons in the employee's position;93 whether
it was likely that the employee would have engaged in such
activity;" and whether, to do the work in question, the employ-
ee relied solely on knowledge gained in the course of employ-
ment.
95
The second Restatement factor, whether the conduct
"occur[red] substantially within the authorized time and space
limits,"96 is relatively uncomplicated in most cases, requiring
only an examination of where and when the employee's efforts
were made. Thus, an employee who testified credibly that he
spent "approximately 3,000 hours outside of normal working
hours" at home creating the work defeated the employer's claim
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1) (1958).
88. SeeAvtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571, (4th Cir. 1994).
89. See Avtec Sys., 1995 WL 541610, at *4 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995); Roeslin, 921 F.
Supp. at 798 (D.D.C. 1995); Beasley, 883 F. Supp. at 8 (D.NJ. 1995).
90. Roeslin, 921 F. Supp. at 798.
91. Id.
92. Beasley, 883 F. Supp. at 8.
93. Roeslin, 921 F. Supp. at 798.
94. Id.
95. Beasley, 883 F. Supp. at 8.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1)(b) (1958).
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to authorship based on employee creation within the scope of
employment.
97
The third and final factor noted in the Restatement,
whether the employee was motivated at least in part by a desire
to serve the employer, would seem potentially to pose some
difficulties. This factor turns on a finding of motive-a factual
issue peculiarly susceptible to self-serving testimony by all
concerned. So far, however, the courts have not been long
detained by this determination, opting for practicality by simply
deciding whom to believe and announcing their decision without
fanfare or soul-searching.98
It thus appears that the determination whether a work was
created by an employee within the scope of employment will
turn on the application of traditional common law principles of
agency law. Although they may on occasion be factually
complex, they are not conceptually difficult, and so far the
common law principles have not been applied in novel or
unusual ways. There remains only an examination of the second
route to work-for-hire status, applicable to commissioned works,
before our analysis of the work-for-hire exception to the "creator
is the author" rule is complete.
b. Commissioned Works Subject to a Writing
As noted previously, most of the difficulty regarding
commissioned works for hire has involved the writing require-
ment and in particular, when the writing stating that the work is
to be considered a work for hire must be executed." For
example, suppose a work is created, and when the creator is
paid, the reverse of the check tendered contains a legend to the
effect that the payment represents all the monies due in respect
97. Roeslin, 921 F. Supp. at 798. See Beasley, 883 F. Supp. at 8 (stating that "Beasley
testified that he drafted [the works in question] at home during off hours.... [Hie did
not use [plaintiffs] facilities to create these materials.").
98. See, e.g., Beasley, 883 F. Supp. at 9 (holding that employee was not motivated by
a desire to serve his employer because the employee testified as such and the employer
offered no evidence to the contrary); Roeslin, 921 F. Supp. at 798-99 (finding that the
employee was primarily motivated to serve his own interests).
99. Compare Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 559 (2d Cir. 1995)
(finding that a writing may be executed after the completion of the work, as long as
agreement predates creation) with Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d
410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (finding that a writing must precede the creation
of the work in order to make the ownership of rights clear and marketable).
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to creation of the work. Putting aside the question whether the
creator can sue for any unpaid balance due, is she bound by the
statement that the work is a work for hire? What if the parties,
in the course of an ongoing relationship in which numerous
works are created, establish a custom of payment with such
checks? These are the essential facts of Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Dumas.1°°
At issue in Dumas was the ownership of copyright in
numerous artworks created by Patrick Nagel for Playboy maga-
zine. 1 During his lifetime, the artist had been commissioned
by Playboy to create numerous works, and after his death the
magazine claimed authorship and, of course, ownership of the
copyrights.102 However, the only writings to which the maga-
zine could point in an attempt to support its claim were special
check endorsements. The argument was that the artist, by
negotiating the check, agreed that the relevant painting was
created as a work for hire.1
03
There were two potential problems with these "writings."
First, it was unclear whether they were sufficient as writings to
satisfy the statutory requirements. Second, none of the endorse-
ments were executed until after the completion of the work in
question-does the Act permit the execution of a writing after the
work in question has been finished?0 4
With respect to the first question, the court held that the
writings (that used the words "work for hire") were sufficient to
meet the statutory requirement that there be a writing; the
writings that did not use the phrase "work for hire," however,
were not sufficient. 10 5  The second question, whether the
writings required by the statute may be executed after the
completion of the work, also was answered affirmatively.16
The rule appears to be that a writing may be executed after the
work is done-but only if there is an agreement before the work
is created.0 7 Thus, while an oral agreement or custom may
100. 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995).
101. Id. at 551.
102. Id. at 552-53.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 559.
105. Id. at 559-560.
106. Id. at 559.
107. The Second Circuit did not address the question whether the agreement must
exist before the creation of the work has commenced.
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suffice to make a work a work for hire, that agreement or
understanding must be memorialized in writing before the
hiring party can enforce its authorship rights.
Other courts, although not confronted with the Dumas facts,
have held that the writing establishing the status of the work as
a work for hire must precede the creation of the work."0 The
rationale for this approach begins with the premise that the
writing requirement serves two purposes: first, to protect against
false claims of ownership that are presumably asserted against
the creator by the hiring party; and second, "to make the
ownership of [intellectual property rights] clear and definite, so
that such property will be readily marketable."1 9 Certainly, if
marketability is a primary purpose of the writing requirement,
the writing should be executed in advance of the work's
creation. Whether this purpose mandates execution of a writing,
however, is less clear. It is a rather paternalistic view of the
statute that would not permit the parties to execute their written
agreement at some later date. °
IV. CONCLUSION
Copyrights are a part of the assets of almost every business.
Some attention to copyright law is therefore advisable, otherwise
significant value may be lost or overlooked. The passage of the
1976 Copyright Act, and its subsequent construction by the
courts, have made copyright law more accessible, and this in turn
makes a working knowledge of basic copyright easier to attain
than ever before. A great deal can be accomplished with a
working knowledge of only the basics of copyright, especially
with respect to questions of copyright ownership. The latter are
often simultaneously the most important, least advised, and
108. E.g., Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir.
1992) (Posner, J.).
109. Schiller & Schmid4 969 F.2d at 412.
110. In response, it might be noted that the statute is, in any event, paternalistic.
There is no other way to describe any writing requirement, especially one that seeks in
part to protect one party-the creator-against the possible fraud of the other party.
Nevertheless, it is one thing to argue that the statute is intended to protect the creator
of the work against possible intimidation and fraud by the hiring party, who may be
presumed to have the superior economic position. It is quite another to maintain that
the same statutory provision is also intended to protect the hiring party against the
consequences of its own carelessness-which is the necessary implication of holding that
"marketability" of the work is a primary purpose of the writing requirement.
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easiest questions in the copyright arena.
The major complexity in copyright ownership involves the
work-for-hire doctrine, some of which has been demystified by
recent decisions of the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts. More importantly, most of the complexity of the
doctrine arises only in the absence of sound planning for
ownership of copyrights. Sound planning should include written
agreements specifying the ownership of any copyrightable works
created in the course of a business relationship. Further, such
agreements should state that the parties agree that the creator
of the work shall be considered an "employee" for copyright
purposes. While this may not be conclusive in the event of
litigation, it may help the court see theway in which the parties
themselves saw their relationship.
The agreements also should state that the work is within one
of the nine categories appearing in the "specially ordered or
commissioned" portion of the work-for-hire definition, and that
as such, the parties agree that the work will be considered a work
for hire. This may function as a backup in the event a court
does not view the relationship as employer-employee. Finally,
the agreements should state that in the event a court does not
consider the work to be "for hire," the parties agree that all of
the author's copyright interest is transferred at the date of
execution of the agreement to the hiring party. Planning should
also include the following: attention to requirements for
copyrightability, including originality and fixation; and attention
to avoidance of infringement on the copyrights of others, such
as covenants, representations and indemnities dealing with
possible findings of liability based on infringement.
Attention paid to these questions is inevitably time well-
spent. It provides some comfort regarding ownership of what
may prove to be a valuable asset. It may provide some protec-
tion against competitor's "knock-offs." Finally, it may help a
client avoid copyright litigation.
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